Everyone wants to see lower political risk in Serbia. In the past six years the country has endured sanctions and war (1999), a popular revolution (2000), dissolution of its federal Yugoslav state, a prime minister’s assassination and subsequent state of emergency (2003) and an eruption of anti-Serb violence in Kosovo (2004), all the while weathering post-socialist economic transition.
But at last there are signs that these topsy-turvy times may be coming to an end. The European Commission’s April 12 decision; placing Serbia and Montenegro on the starting ramp for EU accession is, above all, a vote of confidence that this is so.
“This is the beginning of the European road for Serbia and Montenegro. The country has achieved a great deal over the past few years,” says Olli Rehn, the EU’s commissioner for enlargement.
“Now it is time to move on, time to reward significant progress, and time to show the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro that meeting critical international obligations brings them closer to the EU.”
Stumbling blocks
Many Serbs reject the idea that their “European road” begins in 2005. They trace it back thousands of years, to before the centuries of Ottoman occupation that inculcated their nation with the defiant spirit known locally as inat – cited by businessmen and western diplomats alike as an obstacle.
The EU offers no free ticket to membership of the bloc. Countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose membership remains far off, have already come this far. But the April decision is one of the clearest indications from Brussels so far that Serbia can avoid future isolation in the western Balkans. It came backed by a trade deal, broadening access for Serbian textiles to their primary export market, the EU.
Foreign investors grant the lion’s share of credit for such progress to Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister felled by a sniper’s bullet in Belgrade in 2003.
Mr Djindjic, a hard-as-nails pragmatist, instituted core economic reforms and dared to make difficult political choices. He turned on Slobodan Milosevic’s toppled regime and extradited the shamed former Yugoslav president to face trial in The Hague, heralding a new democratic era in Serbia.
But, in the tumultuous democratic era following Mr Milosevic’s disgrace, credit also belongs to Vojislav Kostunica, the current prime minister. It was his election as Yugoslav president in 2000 that ended authoritarian rule.
Now as a conservative prime minister, Mr Kostunica’s tentative approach on economic reform has disappointed some business leaders. But he has pushed through important changes, including new bankruptcy and company laws and a value-added tax to help lure trade out of Serbia’s grey economy.
Mr Kostunica has also won European backing for his work boosting Serbian co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where Mr Milosevic’s epic trial continues. Mr Kostunica has accomplished this in ways that make western diplomats and Serbian liberals squirm – by publicly offering war crimes indictees financial and legal aid in return for their voluntary surrenders. “These people” must be made aware they can no longer “be a burden on the state”, he says, advocating gentleness on the way to full co-operation with ICTY.
This change in policy, after earlier refusals to arrest war crimes indictees wanted under international warrants, follows the course chosen last year by Croatia. In both cases, EU accolades followed shortly behind.
However, Brussels’ enthusiasm has its limits. The EU showed impatience with Croatia two months ago, scrapping inaugural accession negotiations because Zagreb had failed to extradite one last remaining war crimes indictee. The move represents a caution for Belgrade, too.
Kosovo talks
Serbia is not out of the woods yet, though. Mr Kostunica’s grip on power is brittle in parliament, where an ultranationalist party is the largest single force. Talks on Kosovo’s potential independence could begin this year, and policymakers throughout the western Balkans warn that incautious action could trigger political instability and worse.
For Mr Kostunica, who aims to protect the threatened Serb minority in Albanian-dominated Kosovo, the province’s fate is as much tied up with the EU as any question of international justice. “The question is how Europe can survive morally in case of Kosovo independence,” he says.
Leaders in Belgrade will not forfeit the province willingly, yet they may face western pressure to do so.
“2005 and 2006 will be crucial years for the western Balkans in relation to the EU. We are at a watershed,” says Mr Rehn. If for no other reason than Kosovo, this is true.